

Political Socialization in the Philippines Today: An Empirical Study

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"Signs of the Times"

They seem to be all over the place—these signs of our times. Almost everywhere and at almost any time, whether as a catchy slogan, a jazzy jingle, or as a psychedelically colorful parade about the glorious variety of our cultural background, there is hardly anything that we see, read, or hear that does not tell about what is going on in the country today. "Itaguyod ang Bagong Demokrasya" (meaning Support the New Democracy), proclaim the banners that drape the concrete arches spanning major boulevards. "Sa ikauunlad ng bayan, disiplina ang kailangan" (meaning Discipline is the Key to Progress), exhorts the radio announcer. Does it make you feel like marking time to keep in step as you pick up the tune while the band plays the "Marcha ng Bagong Lipunan" (March of the New Society)? Does your heart swell with patriotic fervor as you stand up and let yourself be counted among those who are waging not only the "Green Revolution" but also the "Democratic Revolution"? Who has not heard about the "Compassionate Society"? One newspaper layout that amused me no end was the familiar boxed-format of the rallying call, "*Support* (underscoring mine) the New Society," quite literally undergirded by an advertisement for a ladies foundation garment!

Levity and irreverence aside, however, there can be no denying that there is a very conscious effort on the part of the government to bring to the awareness of one and all the various measures that have been adopted to bring about drastic reforms in our non-too-ideal political and social life. Whether it is to be regarded as an admirable step or not, still it is noteworthy that the administration has mobilized almost all sectors of the Philippine society not only to

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implement its policies and programs but also to generate support for them.

Conceptual Framework: Definition; "Manifest" vs. "Latent" Function; Agents of Political Socialization

This activity of drumming up support—and, if possible, commitment—for the long-run goals of a political system is what has come to be known in the new-fangled jargon of contemporary political science as "political socialization."¹ Without really trying to inflict upon you the psychologically taxing penchant of the social scientist for hair-splitting and endless definitions of terms, let me just state, by way of a reminder, that "political socialization" has conventionally been viewed in at least two ways:

1. The learning *process* by which the political norms and behavior acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation.²
2. The *ways* in which a society transmits political orientations—knowledge, attitudes or norms and values—from generation to generation.³

Countless other definitions have been proffered, but they are more or less variations on the same theme, so the two given above should suffice for present purposes. Yet, among those that may be worthwhile quoting because of some important additional ingredients are the following:

- (1) Not only the inculcation of information about and evaluations of formal government, but also includes more general attitudes toward the use of and distribution of power."⁴
- (2) One's induction into a political culture, and perhaps one's capacity to change it."⁵
- (3) The process of induction into the political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes—cognitions, value standards, and feelings—toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents. It also includes knowledge of values affecting, and feelings toward, the input of demands and claims into the system, and its authoritative inputs."⁶
- (4) The learning of politically relevant social system patterns corresponding to societal positions and mediated through various agencies of society."⁷

Thus, whether viewed from the standpoint of teaching or learning, depending upon who takes the initiative, we could round up all those definitions of political socialization as an activity that involves a process by which the individual comes to internalize or learn politically relevant social patterns, which includes certain norms, attitudes and behaviors, corresponding to his societal position as mediated or transmitted to him through the various agencies of society.

As an "input" into the political system,⁸ political socialization may be undertaken by the different agents in the society as a "manifest" or a "latent" function.⁹ According to Almond and Coleman, "it is *manifest* political socialization when it takes the form of an explicit transmission of information, values or feelings vis-à-vis the roles, inputs, and outputs of the political system. It is *latent* political socialization when it takes the form of a transmission of information, values, or feelings vis-à-vis the roles, inputs, and outputs of other social systems such as the family which affect attitudes toward *analogous* roles, inputs, and outputs of the political system."¹⁰

It is also quite possible to conceive of socialization as being manifest or latent in terms of the specifically assigned tasks of the different agencies of society. For instance, the church is obviously designed to perform a religious function; this is its "manifest function." Yet who can deny that, at the very least, political socialization is being performed by this social institution, even if only because considerable political power is often ascribed to it? The family is supposed to be the primary teaching venue of social graces and perhaps some spiritual values, yet it can just as easily be the situs where — consciously or unconsciously — civic virtues (or its opposite, political indifference, if not outright alienation or cynicism) can be transmitted from one member to another. What about the subtly obvious (pardon the contradiction in terms!) political content of comic strips, radio and television situation comedies, as well as of novels, poems, and songs of social protest?

Usually, the direction of the communication or transmission line is vertical — from older to younger members of the family or from higher to lower status, as in a hierarchy. But it need not always follow that pattern any more than it does in non-family-type social institutions or groups. The direction of the transmission flow may also be vertical in the opposite direction (from below, upwards, or from younger to older) depending, among other things, upon the degree and quality of exposure to other agents of political

socialization. The direction may also be *horizontal* (among age or occupational peers).

The socialization can even be carried out beyond a nation-state's territorial boundaries. The examples that most easily comes to mind are the student exchange programs and the visitors' exchange programs on the professional level. But sports events and art and other cultural performances have not been spared from being used as instruments of political socialization. Communist China's ballet, "The Red Detachment of Women," is a good example of this. The "Spartakiad" of Czechoslovakia, a quinquennial spectacle, is replete with banners and action motifs that are unquestionably of the flag-waving type.

It has been a conventional assumption, however, to regard certain social institutions as being charged with the manifest function of political socialization. The schools (and, quite obviously, political parties and interest groups) are typically viewed as such. We must not also fail to mention the newspapers and audio-visual news-casts in this category. All other institutions or agents have been traditionally assumed to engage in political socialization only as a latent function. We hasten to add at this juncture that no claim is being made whatsoever that political socialization performed as a manifest function is more effective in bringing about positive political attitudes than when it is carried out simply as a latent function. If at all, there seems to be empirical evidence to the contrary. But more about this later.

I would like to make a slight detour at this point in the discussion by way of clarification. If socialization (of whatever variety) is a teaching/learning process, then political socialization would be no different from political education. But political education, taken very broadly or liberally and viewed in an active (activist) sense, may be manifestly and consciously aimed at bringing about hostile attitudes towards whatever is political or politically relevant. To avoid confusion, however, it is preferred that another term be used — 'politicalization' perhaps? — to denote this negatively-oriented purpose of political education. Note that there is a deliberate dimension here towards bringing about a negative, not a positive, affect. And so, for purposes of this paper, at least, we shall stick to the conventional meaning attached to the expression "political socialization." However, it does not in any way preclude the possibility that, owing to the operation of other forces, the opposite effect is achieved.

Today, therefore, all sectors of society are enjoined — nay,

mobilized, if you will — to unite in an all-out effort to engage in political socialization. And so, we have not only DZRH on “920 kilocycles” and “DPI — Radyo Uno” or “Radyo Dos,” one claiming to be the “Voice of the Philippines,” the other, “the official voice of the Republic of the Philippines.” We have also all other kinds of mass media being engaged or encouraged to discharge this function. The “Pulong-pulong sa Kaunlaran” (Dialogue for Progress) is inescapable if one insists on tuning in on the radio at six-thirty in the morning. Again, there is a captive audience during those nationwide hook-ups covering ceremonies at Maharlika Hall in Malacañang. *Sangguniang Bayan* (Community Forum) units now hold seminars on the new political ideology. And, needless to say, virtually every government agency now has its own “newsletter” of some sort to make known to the public its activities and achievements in the area of public service.

Focus on the Youth

But the schools still seem to be the primary agency deliberately entrusted with the function of political socialization. For while it is generally recognized that socialization continues to take place at every stage in the life cycle — since it is the process by which any social/political system teaches its “new” members (i.e., young natives and elderly immigrants alike) how to internalize political values and norms of the society, it is just as much accepted that the best time to inculcate these values and norms in the life-cycle of the individual is during his youth. The ancient sages had been aware of this; more contemporary thinkers and national leaders subscribe to this belief, too.

And so the schools continue to be the principal instrument by which politically desirable values and norms are transmitted to the young and even to the not-so-very young. There are the YCAP and other curriculum requirements (e.g., the graduating senior’s seminar course on all government programs such as land reform, taxation, etc.) all intended to make the young people knowledgeable about these governmental activities, in an effort to gain support for them. Other political institutions have been evolved, such as the *Kabataang Barangay*, (Youth Groups), to pave the way for the political recruitment of appropriate people into the political system. Other measures include the “study now, pay later” plan and the NMYC-sponsored seminars for out-of-school youth. Of course,

there are the negative approaches, such as the recently enunciated policy of anti-activism.

Whatever the approach may be, it is undeniable that political socialization is being pursued with vigor. It is not our purpose here to render judgment upon the desirability of such a "drive." It is our interest, however, to find out whether these efforts at inducing awareness and soliciting support from the public are effective.

An Empirical Study of Political Socialization

But all the illustrations that I have cited thus far are measures that have only been recently adopted, and so it is too soon and perhaps rather unfair to try to evaluate their effectiveness. Hence, even in the most tentative attempt at assessing the effectiveness of "political socialization in the Philippines today," the definition of "today" must inevitably include a little bit of yesterday.

Therefore, the temporal context of the relevant findings of the study that I would like to report to you on this occasion invites us to work backward in time to 1973, not too long after Proclamation No. 1081. It is a period of relatively sudden change in the political situation—a fact which would doubtless have an effect on the outcome of political socialization in whatever manner it may have been transmitted.

But how do we gauge the effectiveness of political socialization? Only in terms of the contents of the political orientation that it seeks to transmit—i.e., the knowledge, values, and attitudes or norms of behavior acceptable to an ongoing political system, if we were to go by the definitions of the term which we cited earlier in this paper. And so it is in this manner that we shall present our findings to you.

A. Objectives of the Study

The primary impetus of this investigation is the observation that, as early as 1969 or 1970, there appeared to be some perceptible changes in the views and attitudes of young Filipinos towards their peers, their elders and their culture; in short, towards their general environment. Values seemed to be changing; at the very least, norms of behavior were being modified—radically in some areas, more gradually in others. Youthful rebellion seemed to be manifest everywhere. This is specifically true in the area of politics. Impressionistically, this change seemed to partake of the nature of a questioning attitude, or at least a desire to reassess the extant state of affairs (i.e., pre-martial law, martial law regimes). One wonders,

therefore, whether this change is generally observed among the entire population of young Filipinos or is limited to only a few.

Hence this research aimed to —

1. determine whether the political attitudes among the Filipino youth are undergoing a change; and if so, to —
2. find out the nature and pattern of this change;
3. determine what variables influence this attitude change (historical, cultural, situational—e.g., the bad peace and order condition, the declaration of martial law, others); and
4. be able to discern the implications of this attitude change *vis-à-vis* the Philippine political system (e.g., educational, cultural, policy-making implications as well as implications for social change)

B. *Methodology*

For the purpose of relating the political socialization process to the problem of national development, it is necessary to determine the consequence(s) of political socialization to the individual—that is, whether the attitudes and beliefs they acquired are positively- or negatively-oriented. Whereas positive orientation would mean support for the development goals of the society, negative orientation would mean indifference (to say the least) towards the said goals.

With this in mind, we constructed the Political Cynicism Scale (PCS) and the Political Knowledge Scale (PKS) to be incorporated in a self-administered questionnaire.

The Political Knowledge Scale was intended to determine whether our respondent is aware or not of what is happening in his surroundings.

The Political Cynicism Scale, on the other hand, inquired into our respondent's opinions (favorable or unfavorable) on (1) the capacity as well as the integrity of people in politics, as compared to that of people in other careers; and (2) the question of whether the existing political processes, as they actually operate, facilitate the choice of qualified public servants who would look after and work for the general interest.¹¹

In general, political cynicism is the tendency to have a negative view of, or to have negative feelings toward, politically significant objects such as political institutions and processes and political personalities.

In addition to the above two (2) scales, the Resistance to

Innovation Scale (RIS) was also constructed for the purpose of investigating whether our respondents welcome some changes in our country that were brought about by the changed political situation, even to the extent of performing or participating in such activities.

Aside from the PCS, PKS, and RIS, as the main variables constituting the attitudes of the universe of study, the following are also considered as relevant determinants:

1. authoritarian personality variable
2. leadership preference variable
3. social class position and perception
4. degree or amount of exposure to mass media and to the general environment

Authoritarian personality. This variable would not only help in getting the attitudes and values of an individual towards things; it will also help explain how such values and attitudes persist within the individual.

To discover the authoritarian personality characteristics of an individual, some selected dimensions from the AP Scale developed by Adorno and associates were used. These are: (1) conventionalism; (2) authoritarian submission; (3) aggressiveness against violators of conventional values; (4) superstitious and rigid thought categories; (5) toughness identification with power and emphasis on the dominance-submission relation; (6) destructiveness and cynicism; and (7) prejudice.

Our aim here is to find out whether authoritarian personality correlates positively or negatively with the political cynicism scale and with the other measures used, especially leadership preference scale and resistance to innovation scale.

Leadership Preference. This variable can be used on the basis of the hypothesis that "persons strongly preferring authoritarian leadership would tend to be more resistant to progressive innovation (therefore conservative) than those who prefer democratic leadership."¹² This variable would also help in some way to discover the degree of dependence or independence of an individual. Impressionistically, independence (or some amount of it) is one of the main characteristics of the Filipino youth of today.

Social class position and perception. This variable would be determined subjectively; that is, the individual's own perception of his family position in the society. It is therefore necessary that the respondents be provided with categories of social class in order that

a uniform measure and similar meanings as well as implications of responses can be assured. Thus, we can use this variable to investigate the relation, if any, between this subjective estimate and the respondent's values and attitudes towards things at present. To counter-check the answer for the class position of the respondents, we can use some objective measure for class position, such as where they reside, what they own, the occupation of their parents, etc.

Degree or amount of exposure of the respondents to mass media and to their general environment. Francis Madigan, S.J., concluded that isolation is directly proportional to conservatism.¹³ Thus, if we can find a logical connection between this variable and that of the values and attitudes of the respondents, we can explain the "whys" of the attitudes of an individual.

Briefly, with the above-mentioned variables, not only are we able to discover the political values and attitudes of the Filipino youth of today who are the very focus of the study; we can also explain the influence of personality and situational factors on them, as well as the "hows" and the "whys" of their present attitudes and value characteristics.

In addition to the aforementioned attitudinal variables under investigation, this study also seeks to determine the different agencies of political socialization—family, peer group, school, church and mass media—that play vital roles in the development of the attitudes of our respondents, and to indicate the extensiveness of the influence exerted by the said agencies.

The main bulk of the data was gathered through questionnaires that were administered among high school students in selected types of schools in the greater Manila Area based on proportional stratified random sampling.

The questionnaire was drafted and finalized after more than a month of preliminary pretesting and revision of the questions in order to minimize vagueness or ambiguity and to ensure their credibility to our respondents. Also, the questions originally written in English were translated to Filipino with the end in view of coming out with a bilingual questionnaire. A re-translation to English was done, too, for the purpose of insuring that the Filipino version more or less carried similar meanings and connotations.

The final form of the questionnaire was then formally pretested among 49 high school students at the Parañaque Community High School. This was done for the purpose of rechecking the validity and usefulness of the proposed variables—PCS, PKS, RIS, LP, social

class perception, situational variables, degree of exposure to mass media and to the general environment—with regard to the objectives of this study; and, in the long run, to see whether or not the questionnaire as a data-gathering instrument actually serves the purpose of the study.

Even now, we can already give the answer to this last question. Obviously, there are limitations to the use of a questionnaire as an instrument of data-collection. Whatever findings we have could only be applicable to the literate, school-going youth. Dropouts and out-of-school youth are effectively screened out. Please be assured that this arose not out of any conscious or subconscious desire to discriminate against them. It simply came out of practical considerations—primarily financial; with the limited resources made available to us, this was the best method we could devise to get the information we wanted. It would have been more desirable if we had been able to include even the nonliterate in our sample; but that would have entailed the employment of skilled and conscientious interviewers, a luxury we could ill afford. We tried our very best, however, to offset this limitation by hoping to draw into our sample certain types of schools where people coming from the lower economic level would be enrolled. Fortunately, the basic random sampling technique allowed us to realize this *hope*.

In addition, the pretest was conducted to test the validities and reliabilities of each of the four scales (PCS, PKS, RIS, APS, LPS) incorporated in the survey instrument of the scale as a whole, and of each of the items included in each scale. Furthermore, the codes and categories of answers formulated were based on the different responses elicited for the open-ended questions.

C. *Some Pertinent Findings*

For present purposes, however, we shall concentrate on the attitudinal outcomes of political socialization. After all, it is only reasonable to assume that attitudes would be more basic as indicators of support for a political system or regime than other manifestations like, say, the behavioral dimension. Any behavioral confirmations would have to be done later on in the life cycle of our subjects because anything along these lines at the moment could easily be attributed simply to the fact that they are obeying orders or fulfilling curricular requirements.

1. *Political Cynicism*

As earlier indicated, the principal attitudinal measure used is that

of the Political Cynicism Scale (PCS) which yields a frequency distribution following a normal curve. Almost half of the total number of respondents (327 out of 752) fall in the medium-level or mildly cynical category and the other half was evenly distributed between the "low" and the "high" scorers (203 and 222 respondents, respectively.)¹⁴

Hence, our respondents are considered to be politically cynical. This finding is supported not only by the present research but also by an earlier study conducted by this writer.¹⁵

Bearing in mind the components of the political cynicism scale, we wanted to know if they relate to other items in the questionnaire.¹⁶ They provide added insight into the real content or nature of the political cynicism of our respondents. The findings that are directly relevant to our concerns this morning are the following items:

Question #59: It is often said that "politics is a dirty game." How do you feel about this idea?

The figures obtained on this particular item obviously reflect the consistency of the general attitude of our respondents *vis-à-vis* their responses to the above statement. Of the 171 students who *completely agree* with the statement, 47.9 per cent are *highly cynical* and 16.3 per cent are less cynical. On the other hand, only 104 (13.8 per cent of the 752 subjects *completely disagree* with the statements, with 43 (41.3), 42 (40.4) and 19 (18) as the low, medium and high scorers, respectively.

The juxtaposition between the PCS scorers and the answers to Question #53, *viz.* "Do you believe that politics is a desirable career for an able young man, or would he usually tend to be better off in some other career?", yielded the following results:

While 316 (42 per cent) of the 752 respondents believed that politics "is a desirable career for an able young man," 406 (53.9 per cent) asserted that he would be better off in another career. Taking the first group, 76 belong to the "high" scorers and 97 to the "low" scorers and 43 are neutral. Of the second group, 138 are "high" scorers, 100 are "low" scorers and 168 are "medium" scorers on the PCS.

Consistency is further maintained by the breakdowns in the responses elicited by Question #54-a: "Would you personally be interested in a national political career if it were possible?" Here, 283 (34.64 per cent) said "NO" and 262 (32.07 per cent) said "YES". From the "No" group, 61 are "low" scorers, 106 are medium", and

72 are "high" scorers. From the "Yes" group, 65 are "low" scorers, 107 are "mildly cynical," and 94 are "high" scorers.

There is one puzzling finding, however. To the question (#51a), "Do you like politicians?" 404 (53.7 per cent) answered positively, with 116 as the low scorers, 181 the medium-level scorers, and 107 the high scorers. Out of the 182 who answered in the negative, 67 belong to the "low" group, 116 to the "medium" group, and 99 to the "high" group. Many answered that they liked politicians for the services they rendered (the respondents, of course, did not make it clear what these services were and for whom these services were rendered). Figuring out all these items together, we can only surmise that, in spite of the fact that our respondents considered politicians as indispensable in some respects, still for one reason or another they refused to have anything to do with politics themselves and will even discourage an able young man from entering politics.

Opinions regarding the martial law regime, new society and government are as follows:

2. On the Martial Law Regime, New Society and Government

Question #62. Do you think there is an increase or decrease of public faith in the government, under the "New Society"?

The table shows that Item No. 2 (increase of public faith) garnered the highest number of respondents (552) out of 752 respondents, and only 71 answered negatively (decrease of public faith). From among those who answered positively, 237 (41.0 per cent) belong to the mildly cynical, whereas 147 (26.6 per cent) are less cynical and 168 (30.4 per cent) are highly cynical.

On the other hand, out of 71 respondents who believed that there is a decrease of public faith, 32 (46.0 per cent) belong to the middle category of the distribution, 18 (25.4 per cent) are less cynical and 21 (29.6 per cent) are highly cynical.

There seems to be a contradiction between the positive answers (to the question) of our highly, politically cynical respondents. This can be explained by the fact that their answer is based on their personal perception or observation of the apparent public attitude towards the government. It could be that their general perception of today's events is independent of the general political attitudes of our respondents.

Question #64. Do you support the goals and ideals of the "New Society"?

Surprisingly, out of 752, 631 (83.9 per cent) respondents

answered "YES" to the above question and only 7 (.9 per cent) answered "NO". The sum total of those who answered "indifferent" and "no comment" is 70 (9.3 per cent). These two items are put together because they somehow reflect one thing: apathy. This also reflects the faith of our subject of study in the present political and governmental activities as against the pre-martial law regime.

Question #57 (a). Do you think the declaration of "martial law" would solve the various problems of the country today?

Of the respondents, 615 (81.7 per cent) answered positively, while only 29 (3.8 per cent) answered in the negative. Out of the 615, 189 are considered as highly cynical, 163 as less cynical, and 263 as medium scorers.

The result of this particular juxtaposition is consistent with the results in question numbers 62 and 64. That is, although our respondents are generally cynical, their answers indicate support for the government, new society and martial law. Perhaps, we could explain this by our respondents' belief that our present political arrangement is different and had improved as compared with the past (pre-martial law), thereby implying their hopes towards the capacity of our present system to solve the problems that the previous system failed to cope with, which somehow affected the general attitudes of our subjects of study.

Question #47: Do you think the government can help you solve your problem?

Again, of the 373 (49.6 per cent) students who answered *positively*, 113 (30.3 per cent) are high cynical politically and 94 (25.2 per cent) are less cynical. On the other hand, 44 (34.1 per cent) out of 129 (17.1 per cent) subjects whose answers are negative are highly cynical and only 33 (25.6 per cent) are less cynical.

All of the above show that our respondents can perceive the government as an institution separate from the people (politicians) manning it. And this implies that our respondents, young as they are, are capable of judging things around them, i.e., they can discriminate in their perceptions or cognitions.

3. *Education vs. Political Influence*

Like the rest of Philippine society, our respondents put a high premium on education, especially with regard to employment. (It is also their perceived basis of our social class system and the main avenue for upward social mobility.) Sixty-three per cent think that proper education is more important than political contacts and influence (2.94 per cent) and experience (29.25 per cent) in looking for

a job. Thus, in answer to Item No. 8b, 52.75 per cent intend to go to college to get a better job. These findings imply that in the minds of the respondents, the "best qualified for the job"¹⁷ are those who necessarily count proper education among their attributes.

This growing universalism, by the way, is further reflected in their political values, as when they overwhelmingly (99.88 per cent) claim that they would vote for "a qualified candidate, whether or not he is your friend or relative." (See Table 2, Item No. 40.)

Not surprisingly, the respondents put so much trust and confidence in educated people as shown in Item Nos. 42 and 43. Almost 49 per cent think that educated persons and professionals have the right idea about what is good for the country. It is noteworthy that only 3.43 per cent think that the students know best, considering that students constitute the universe of study. Another interesting datum is that the respondents put the common *tao*¹⁸ (19.95 per cent) ahead of the politicians and political leaders (13.34 per cent) as having the right idea about what is good for the country.

Apparently, the respondents would rather cast the country's lot with the common *tao* than with politicians if no better alternative were given. But given the choice between the educated sector and the common *tao*, the respondents would stake their future with the former. Reinforcing these opinions, 53.73 per cent think that educated persons and professionals usually have a strong influence or can exert pressure in the decision-making in the government, followed by the common *tao* with 17.14 per cent in their favor. Again, it would seem that the respondents do not really think much of politicians, despite their endorsement of these people in Item No. 51a (Table 3).

The implications of these responses on democratic decision-making are rather intriguing, although no doubt it would have made Plato beam with satisfaction at this tacit though largely unconscious modern-day endorsement of his classic ideas on the "philosopher-king."

4. *Family Orientations, Social Values and Beliefs*

The family as an agent of political socialization certainly impinges upon the formation of political values of our young people.

It would seem that the respondents believed that the father is not the sole repository of the decision-making power in the family. In answer to Item No. 30, the respondents said that the father and the mother will jointly make the decision if and when they have their own families. Perhaps this is an offshoot of the practice in the families of

the respondents (41.13 per cent) where both parents make the decision. In addition, the fact that only the parents make the important decisions does not bother the respondents so much, for they indicated in Item No. 14 that they were generally satisfied (79.44 per cent) with the amount of influence they have in family decisions.

This carries with it the implication that they try not to meddle with the parents' decisions; that they believe that children should keep to their own spheres; and that the decision-making setup in the family is not too "democratic." If it were, then the choice of the "family council" (consisting of parents and children) would have obtained a more impressive vote than a mere 27.54 per cent (cf. Item No. 9). However, it would seem that the trend is towards a more "democratic" decision-making system since 45.90 per cent of the respondents said that, if and when they have their own families, the family council will make the decisions on important matters that concern the family.

This time, however, as compared to a small group of respondents of less than a decade ago, there is a slight shift in the recognition given to the principal *human* sources of political information.¹⁹ Whereas before the parents were given the credit for performing this function, whether they really meant to or not, now the teachers received more votes, though only by a plurality. (See Table 2, Item No. 33.)

This might help explain the findings that follow:

More than a majority of the respondents seem to favor Martial Law and the New Society. Asked as to what they thought of the Philippine political system before Martial Law, 59.85 per cent thought that it was bad, and 13.10 per cent observed that it did not work too well (Table 3, Item No. 44a).²⁰ Seventy-five per cent think that the political system in the New Society under Martial Law is doing well. In addition, the proposition that the people find new hope in the "New Society" can be inferred from the result of Item No. 62 wherein 72 per cent of the respondents think that there is an increase of public faith in the government at present. This implies that public faith in the government prior to Martial Law had wavered, which is consistent with the finding in Item No. 44a.

There are at least three possible explanations for the favorable attitude of the respondents. Firstly, since Martial Law denotes the priority of the state over the individual, our respondents might have had misgivings about airing their criticisms about the political system. Even if it is a different kind of Martial Law ("Martial Law

with a Heart," "a humane Martial Law" or "Martial Law, Philippine Style"), the fact remains that it is still Martial Law. Secondly, it is entirely possible that the continuous plugging of the "good things" brought about by the regime on television, radio and the newspapers helped a good deal to glamorize and legitimize the Martial Law regime, not to mention the suspected practice of pushing into the background any news or events that would be detrimental to the image the government wants to build. Thirdly, even oppositionists or critics cannot completely disregard the proposition that indeed the Martial Law regime was able to accomplish changes and improvements both tangible and intangible for the betterment of Filipino life—in the political, social, moral, and economic spheres. The third reason, for all we know, may be the most plausible for some sectors.

Thus, our youthful respondents obviously expect so much from the government today. This dependence can be gleaned from Item No. 47 wherein 49.2 per cent think that the government can help them solve their problems as against 17.75 per cent who think otherwise. This is reinforced by the finding in Item No. 48 wherein 60.71 per cent think that the government is the best institution to cope with the demands of a developing nation like the Philippines. Presumably, this dependence is one explanation why 81 per cent of the respondents think that the declaration of Martial Law would solve the various problems of the country today (Item No. 57a). Rightly or wrongly, a good number of our young people seem to treat Martial Law as the panacea for all evils.

All these apparently favorable findings notwithstanding, this partial report of an empirical study by no means intends to convey the suggestion that the authorities can now be complacent. If anything, it is now that they cannot afford the luxury of becoming smug. For, to the extent that the young people repose their trust in the government today, to the same extent the government is expected to "deliver." Otherwise, the cynicism that now seems to be heaped solely on the old-style politicians of the "Old Society" will also spill over to the government. Of course the government, in turn—perhaps not unjustifiably—also contends that it can only "deliver" with the cooperation of the people themselves.

This is where active political socialization once again comes in. For then, the inculcation of civic consciousness is an important ingredient of political socialization. For if socialization in this dimension is aimed at the internalization of society's political norms and values, our norms and values demand an awareness not only of our civil rights but also the faithful discharge of our civic

duties. Only then can we apply that other test of the effectiveness of political socialization — on the voluntary, behavioral level.

And so we have come full circle on the topic. Just one post-script to this whole discussion: it would be immensely interesting if a systematic study could be made to test the hypothesis that "the more radical and rapid the social change envisioned, the more deliberate and manifest the political socialization activities of the political system tend to be."

Appendix 1
BATTERY FOR THE POLITICAL CYNICISM SCALE

Q. #57. How do you feel about each of the following statements? (Check only *one*. (Respondent must check only one of the five categories provided for each of the items below.)

- (1) _____ Completely agree
- (2) _____ Slightly agree
- (3) _____ Indifferent
- (4) _____ Slightly disagree
- (5) _____ Completely disagree

- a. "People in other careers usually work harder than people in politics."
- b. "The best man usually wins elections in this country."
- c. "Most politicians are mainly out to get something for themselves."
- d. "Dishonesty seems to be more common in politics than in most other careers."
- e. "Many politicians treat some voters better than they treat others, when they should treat all voters equally."
- f. "In general, politicians are very able people who would succeed in most other careers."
- g. "Many of the statements of politicians cannot really be believed."
- h. "Many politicians are really under the control of vested interests."

The answer that evinces the greatest degree of cynicism gets a score of 5 points, the next highest, 4 points, and so on down the scale. The least cynical answer scores one point. The scale scores range all the way from 8 to 40 points. The higher the score, the higher the level of political cynicism.

Individual scores were aggregated into three levels of cynicism: low scores 8-25 (those falling into the first quartile); medium level scores 26-31 ("midly cynical"); and high scores 32-40 (last quartile).

Appendix 2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Table 1 Education

Item No. 18. Suppose you were the manager of a big company that needs some men to fill some vacant positions, would you hire applicants because:

	No.	Per Cent
they are your relatives	15	1.84
they are the protégés or recommendees of your best friend	10	1.22
they are the best qualified for the job	778	95.23
no answer/blank	11	1.35

Item No. 42. Which group of people do you think usually have the right idea about what is good for the country?

educated persons/professionals	398	48.71
businessmen and landowners/hacenderos	19	2.33
students	28	3.43
the 'common tao'	163	19.95
media people	63	7.71
the politicians and political leaders	109	13.34
no answer/blank	37	4.53

Item No. 43. Which group of people do you think usually has a strong influence or can exert pressure in the decision-making in the government?

educated persons/professionals	439	53.73
businessmen and landowners	85	10.40
students	26	3.18
the 'common tao'	140	17.14
the media people	65	7.96
foreigners	26	3.18
no answer/blank	36	4.41

**Table 2. Family Orientation, Social Values
and Beliefs**

ITEM No. 14. Are you generally satisfied with the amount of influence that you yourself have in the family decision?

	No.	Per Cent
I am generally satisfied	649	79.44
I am generally not satisfied	86	10.53
I don't care one way or the other	70	8.57
no answer/blank	12	1.47

Item No. 18. Suppose you were the manager of a big company that needs some men to fill some vacant positions, would you hire applicants because:

they are your relatives	15	1.84
they are the protégés or recommendees of your best friend	10	1.22
they are the best qualified for the job	778	95.23
no answer/blank	11	1.35

Item No. 29. In general, how are decisions in your family arrived at?

by and large, my father makes the decision	145	17.75
by and large, my mother makes the decision	40	4.90
both my parents together make the decision	336	41.13
my parents make the decision, each alone at different times	31	3.79
our family council (consisting of parents and children) makes the decision	225	27.54
my grandparents make the decision	5	0.61
I don't know	14	1.71
no answer/blank	21	2.57

Item No. 30. In the making of an important decision in the family, which of the following would you like to follow when you have your own family?

the father will make the decision	125	15.30
the mother will make the decision	11	1.35
the father and the mother will jointly make the decision	375	45.90
the family council will make the decision	239	29.25
the grandparents will make the decision	5	0.61

Table 2 (Continued)

I don't know yet	41	5.02
no answer/blank	21	2.57

Item No. 33. Now, from which of the following sources do you get most of your information about politics?

parents	227	27.78
teachers	281	34.39
other adults in my family (except my parents)	79	9.67
other adults not in my family (except teachers)	96	11.75
friends of about my age	27	3.30
someone else	60	7.34
no answer/blank	47	5.75

Item No. 40. Would you vote for:

a candidate who had done you a favor	0	0.00
a candidate who is your friend or relative	1	0.12
a qualified candidate, whether or not he is your friend and relative	816	99.88

Table 3. Political Attitudes and Behavior, Values and Dispositions

Item No. 44a. On the whole, what can you say of the Philippine political system (politics) before martial law?

	No.	Per Cent
bad	489	59.85
not too well	107	13.10
fair	73	8.94
very well	49	6.00
indifferent	23	2.82
I don't know	44	5.39
no answer/blank	32	3.92

Item No. 45: What is your opinion now of our political system (in the new society under martial law)?

it is doing well/good	614	75.15
not totally good/good but...	66	8.08
not good	4	0.49
don't know	45	0.61
'no comment' answers	10	1.22

Table 3 (Continued)

general ambiguous answers	25	3.06
no answer/blank	93	11.38

Item No. 47. Do you think the government can help you solve your problems?

yes	402	49.20
no	145	17.75
I don't know	251	30.72
no answer/blank	19	2.33

Item No. 48. Which do you think is the best institution to cope with the demands of a developing nation like the Philippines?

the government	496	60.71
school	90	11.02
family	55	6.73
business establishment	34	4.16
civic and private organizations	102	12.48
church and religious organization	19	2.33
no answer/blank	21	2.57

Item No. 51a. Do you like politicians?

yes	436	53.37
no	300	36.72
no answer/blank	81	9.91

Item No. 53. Do you believe that politics is a desirable career for an able young man, or would he usually tend to be better off in some other career?

politics is a desirable career	347	42.47
he would usually be better off in another career	428	52.39
no answer/blank	42	5.14

Item No. 54a. Would you personally be interested in a national political career if it were possible?

yes	262	32.07
no	283	34.64
I don't know	248	30.35
no answer/blank	24	2.94

Table 3 (Continued)

Item No. 57a. Do you think the declaration of martial law would solve the various problems of the country today?

yes	663	81.15
no	32	3.92
don't know	99	12.12
no answer/blank	23	2.82

Item No. 60a. As a citizen of the Philippines, what do you think is your primary responsibility/duty towards your country?

politically	33	4.04
economically	14	1.71
socially	294	35.99
morally	8	0.98
educationally	17	2.08
militarily	14	1.71
health and sanitation	12	1.47
none/nothing	5	0.61
don't know	4	0.49
'no comment' answers	1	0.12
other general, ambiguous answers	339	41.49
no answer/blank	76	9.30

NOTES

¹Cf. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, c. 1965) and Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960) for a structural-functional elaboration of the systems approach.

²Roberta Sigel, ed., "Assumptions about the Learning of Political Values," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 361 (September 1965), p. 1.

³David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," in *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴Frederick W. Frey, "Political Socialization in Developing Nations." Working paper prepared for the summer seminar on "Political Research," July 27 to August 7, 1964, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p. 3.

⁵Dwayne Marvick, "The Political Socialization of the American Negro," in Sigel, *The Annals*, p. 113.

⁶Almond and Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas*, pp. 27-28.

⁷Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Personality and Political Socialization," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May 1961), p. 342.

⁸Easton, *Systems Analysis*.

⁹Almond and Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas*, esp. pp. 28-31.

¹⁰Quoted verbatim from *Politics of Developing Areas*, p. 28; underscoring mine.

¹¹The items in the cynicism battery appear in the Appendix.

¹²Francis C. Madigan, S.J., *The Farmer Said "No"* (UP: Community Development Research Council, 1968), p. 24.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁴The determination of cut-off points for each category is explained in the Appendix. Incidentally, we would like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance given by Ms. Erlinda Arabejo and Ms. Elizabeth Magsipok, as well as the processing job performed by Mr. Gerardo Villaroman of the UP Computer Center.

¹⁵Loretta Makasiar Sicat, "The Political Attitudes of Young Filipinos: A Study in Political Socialization." Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970. An excerpt of this work is published under the title, "The Fair Hope of the Fatherland' Takes a look at Politics in the Old Society," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (October 1973), pp. 437-65.

¹⁶Chi-square computations reveal that answers to 11 questions have a bearing on the scores of our respondents.

¹⁷For Item No. 18, 95.23 per cent would like to fill vacant positions with applicants who are best qualified for the job, as against 1.84 per cent who would rather fill them with relatives and 1.22 per cent who would prefer protégés and recommendees of friends.

¹⁸A local term for common man.

¹⁹Cf. L. Makasiar Sicat, *Political Attitudes of Young Filipinos*, p. 170.

²⁰This is a stronger reaction than the one registered in a previous finding which, while also being negative, simply conceded that the system "was not working too well." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 106 (mimeographed copy). See also Sicat, "The Fair Hope of the Fatherland," pp. 452-53.